Transaction costs analysis is concerned with ways of aligning appropriate governance modes with the attributes of economic transactions. Nowadays transaction costs are universally accepted, despite the difficulty in measuring and quantifying them. Starting from the customary definition of transaction costs, this paper proposes a model for the buyer/seller relationship, focusing on the uncertainty characterizing the exchange and the connected costs. In particular, according to a well-known classification, the transaction costs connected to the purchasing phase are divided into ex ante (drafting and negotiating agreements) and ex post (monitoring and enforcing agreements)
INTRODUCTION
The theory of Transaction Costs Analysis (TCA) builds upon the issue of the boundary of the firm, that was first addressed by Coase (1937) . According to Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1981 , a transaction occurs when a product or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. Transactions involve costs related to the issues of finding a counterpart, drawing up a contract or monitoring the task completion. These costs are both incurred by government organizations or autonomized parts of these organizations (North, 1990) .
A well-known qualitative classification of transaction costs divides them into ex ante and ex post costs (Buvik, 2002) . In particular, ex ante costs represent direct opportunity costs (Malone, 1987, Masten, Meehan and Snyder, 1991) , which imply productivity losses resulting from the lack of appropriate employment of specific assets (Rindfleish and Heide, 1997) . Moreover, ex post transaction costs are associated with the problems of performance control, performance verification, adjustment and bargaining (Buvik and Halskau, 2001 ). This paper focuses on some of these transaction costs. In particular, we determine the costs connected to the purchase of a new product/service, which are called Additional Costs of Purchasing (ACP); obviously, the summation of ACP and the purchasing price provides the Total Cost of Purchasing (TCP).
More precisely, in a buyer/supplier relationship ex ante costs may be viewed as the costs of research of suppliers, the negotiation costs and the costs of approving and drafting the contract. In the same case, ex post costs consider the quality control costs and the enforcement costs. As remarked by Shelanski and Klein (1995) , transaction cost economics studies also how trading partners protect themselves from the hazard associated with exchange relationships.
However, despite the numerous contributions in the related literature, research on TCA has mainly focused on descriptive and empirical predictions. Indeed, although nowadays transaction costs are universally accepted, researchers in the field agree on the difficulty in measuring and quantifying them. Motivated by such a research gap, in this paper we propose an approach to estimate (in a probabilistic way) the ACP and, consequently, the TCP before the exchange is actually carried out, so that a decision support system for the buyer is available.
As far as human behavior is concerned, TCA stresses bounded rationality: in other words, it focuses on the human behavior characteristics to be intendedly rational, but only limitedly so, and on opportunism, i.e. self-interest seeking with guile (Simon, 1961) . Hence, a certain degree of uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism seems to be common in practice (Bogt, 2003) . However, it is difficult to quantify uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism. Moreover, the main characteristics differentiating a transaction from another is asset specificity, that seems to determine the governance structure of an economic organization (Williamson, 1985 (Williamson, , 1996 . In order to deal with the uncertainty typical of an exchange, the paper focuses on the uncertainty characterizing such a relationship and the connected costs. In particular, the presented model employs two different and complementary approaches: 1) statistical models and probabilistic ways of thinking, that allow the determination of the costs related to the transaction; 2) fuzzy logic based reasoning, that addresses the problem of quantifying the subjective parameters characterizing the behavior of the buyer, that are related to the peculiar buyer/seller relationship and to the specific type of product/service. More precisely, the problem of quantifying all the transaction costs connected to the supply of a new product/service is addressed by using appropriate deterministic models for ex ante costs and suitable statistical distributions for ex post costs. Subsequently, in order to correctly model the behavior of the buyer, a fuzzy logic inference system is designed. Thanks to the ability of fuzzy reasoning to incorporate qualitative knowledge with quantitative information such as real data, the necessary parameters to determine the transaction costs are estimated by way of expert judgments and qualitative rules. Based on the data obtained by the fuzzy logic inference system, the supply of a new product/service may be simulated considering all the connected transaction costs, that are determined by using appropriate statistical distributions. As a result, the buyer may quantify before actually carrying out a transaction the total costs of the supply.
We evaluate the proposed model by simulating several transactions on the basis of data obtained by interviews with a buyer of an industrial company. The simulation experiments considered in the paper focus on three main factors of TCA: the types of the exchanged product, characterized by the product standardization level, the supply value and the trust component in the buyer/seller relationship, modeled by the supplier reliability. Several simulation experiments are reported with relation to these transaction key points. The obtained results confirm the typical behaviors of partners involved in an exchange and give buyers some useful piece of advice about how to carry on a transaction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the basic steps of the theoretical model of the purchasing process and Section 3 outlines the fuzzy logic inference system determining the data required by the model of the previous Section. Subsequently, Section 4 presents the simulation data and the simulation results. A Conclusion Section and a Reference Section complete the paper. 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE PURCHASING PROCESS

THE PURCHASING PROCESS
The steps of a generic purchasing process are depicted in from the design of the product or the choice of the service, the buyer checks the potential suppliers and contacts them. Next, the suppliers make a feasibility study in order to decide whether starting the production of the required goods/service is advantageous. Hence, at the end of this process some of them refuse the job. Subsequently, the buyer starts negotiating with those suppliers who have accepted the exchange, and at last only one supplier is chosen.
Finally, in order for the selected supplier to be remunerated, his supply has to pass the quality check, otherwise a legal enforcement is possible.
The previously described purchasing process is significantly influenced by three main factors belonging to TCA: the types of exchanged products, the supply value and the trust component in the buyer/seller relationship. The first element influences significantly the purchasing process (Costantino and Pietroforte, 2005) . Indeed, the purchasing process of a highly standardized product (e.g. These purchase features lead to the persistence of using proven and known suppliers, independently from the possible advantages of shared idiolects.
Hence, the two types of products lead to significantly different purchasing processes.
Moreover, products with different supply values clearly lead to different levels of attention in the buying process, and then different transaction costs. More precisely, a low supply value leads to lower values of the ACP, whereas a high supply value involves higher costs of such a kind.
The third element differentiating the purchasing process is strictly connected to the buyer/seller relationship, that is characterized by different types of trust. Sako (1992) focuses on three types of trust: 1) contractual trust, i.e. trust in that the other party will execute the contract; 2) competence trust, i.e. trust in that the other party is competent; 3) goodwill trust, i.e. trust in that the other party is committed to the relationship and will do, whenever possible, more than what is specified in the contract. Both contractual and competence trust are necessary to carry out any buyer/seller relationship. What really distinguishes a cooperative relationship from a competitive one is that the former depends on and is sustained by the existence of goodwill trust, which is not present in the latter form of relationship.
THE PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE PURCHASING PRICE AND OF THE
ADDITIONAL COSTS OF PURCHASING
In the following we describe the statistical distributions used in the presented model to quantify the expected costs for the supply, starting from the purchasing price. In particular, it is assumed that the probability distribution of the purchasing price is Gaussian and may thus be characterized by an average value (which is the price expected by the buyer) and a standard deviation (because the offered price varies from a supplier to another): obviously, such parameters are significantly different for a standardized or customized product.
The choice of a Gauss distribution is motivated by the fact that the technologies used by different suppliers and the dimension of each of these can affect, even significantly, the charged purchasing prices. Obviously, the standard deviation for standardized products is lower than the one associated with customized goods: indeed, the possibility to obtain different prices for the former type of product is lower than for the latter. Figure 2 shows two examples of the probability distribution of the purchasing price for two products, corresponding to the expression: 
where µ and σ are the average value and the standard deviation of the considered distribution, respectively, P P represents the purchasing price in
Euros and P(P P ) is its probability value. Note that in Figure 2 the values µ 1 =µ 2 =25,000 Euros, σ 1 =500 Euros and σ 2 =2,500 Euros are chosen, where the pedices 1 and 2 obviously refer to the two different products. Hence, in the considered cases the former product is labeled commodity product, while the latter is indicated as an asset specific product (compare the values of σ 1 and σ 2 and the distributions depicted in Figure 2 ). According to the theory first proposed by Coase (1937) and subsequently extended by Buvik (2002) , this model classifies the ACP into ex ante and ex µ post costs. In particular, ex ante costs are composed by:
1) the costs of research of suppliers C R ;
2) the negotiation costs C N with the suppliers that are able to supply the product;
3) the costs of drafting and approval of the contract C DA with the supplier that has proposed the best price, considering also the buyer's preference rate, defined in the sequel, that varies from a supplier to another.
In addition, ex post costs are divided into:
1) the quality control costs C Q ;
2) the enforcement costs C E . Accordingly, research and contact costs are expressed as follows:
Ex ante
where s is the number of consulted suppliers, c A represents the hour cost of the buyer, and t Ri and t Ci represent respectively the research time and the contact time for the generic i-th supplier.
Moreover, negotiation costs may be expressed as follows:
where a is the number of suppliers that are able to supply the new product/service and t Ni is the negotiation time for the generic i-th supplier.
In addition, the costs of drafting and approval of the contract with the chosen supplier are:
with t DA representing the time of approval and drafting of the contract.
As regards the quality control costs, if c Q is the hour cost of the quality department employee and t Q represents the control time for the supply, then such costs may be determined as follows:
Analogously, the enforcement costs are:
where c E indicates the hour cost of the lawyer and t E is the enforcement time.
In particular, we assume that the quality control time is modeled by a Beta
where T Q =t Q /t Qmax is the normalized control time, P(T Q ) is its probability value, t Qmax is the quality control time maximum value for the selected supplier and b 1
and b 2 are the distribution characteristic parameters.
In addition, the exponential distribution is expressed by:
where P(t E ) is the enforcement time probability value and µ E is the average value for the enforcement time.
The two distributions expressed by equations (7) and (8) and µ E =3h are chosen.
Finally, the ACP, indicated by C T , are the summation of the previously mentioned costs, i.e. it holds: 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE PURCHASING PROCESS
The theoretical model of the purchasing process is composed of several steps, that are summarized in the flow chart depicted in Figure 4 . In particular, according to the previously introduced model of the purchasing price and of the ACP, the flow chart in Figure 4 shows all the considered hierarchical levels in order to calculate the total costs of a supply. More precisely, the model starts with the buyer choosing the number s of suppliers to be consulted, so that it is possible to determine the research and contact costs C R according to (2).
Subsequently, the five steps that are briefly outlined in the sequel are executed.
From now on, only one supplier
Total costs
Calculation of the total costs
Step 4 : determining the control time
Quality tests
Calculation of the quality control costs
Step 5 : determining the enforcement time
Enforcement
Calculation of the enforcement costs a suppliers able to supply the product/service
Calculation of the negotiation costs
Calculation of drafting costs and approval of the contract
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Research of s suppliers
Calculation of the research costs
Step1: determining capable suppliers
Purchasing price/ choice of supplier Evaluating the Lowest Purchasing Price
Step 2 : determining the purchasing price via the Gauss distribution and preference rate Step 1. Identify the suppliers involved in the exchange and determine the negotiation costs. This step evaluates the number a≤s of suppliers, among the s consulted ones, that are able to supply the required product/service. Such a number is determined by simulating the feasibility study made by the i-th supplier for i=1,…,s via a uniform probability p i of success assigned by the expert to each seller and indicating the probability that the supplier will accept to take part in the exchange. Obviously, the success probability is strictly connected both to the buyer/seller relationship and to the reliability of the considered supplier, as well as to contingent phenomena, such as strikes, supplier workloads etc. Hence, the success probability belongs to the experience of the buyer or the logistics employee.
Having identified the suppliers available for the transaction, it is now possible to determine the negotiation costs C N according to (3).
Step 2. Determine the purchasing price. In this step, the Gauss distribution described by equation (1) is employed in order to determine the probability distribution of all the offers of the different suppliers. In particular, the model chooses at random a purchasing prices from the distribution just mentioned.
Next, the prices are compared considering the preference rate γ, defined as the percentage of the purchasing price that the buyer is willing to pay more in order to obtain the supply from a certain supplier. This rate may change from a supplier to another: for instance, for some supplier it may hold γ=0, which models the circumstance that the buyer has no preference for such a provider (e.g. the latter has never participated to a transaction with the purchaser).
Finally, the chosen supplier is determined as the one exhibiting the Lowest Purchasing Price (LPP), defined as follows:
where P Pi is the generic purchasing price which is associated to the preference rate γ i for the i-th supplier.
Step 3. Determine the costs of drafting and approval of the contract. Once the negotiating is finished and only one supplier is chosen, it is necessary to determine the probability to draft and approve the contract. Hence, we introduce a uniform probability P S of success in drafting and approving the contract, a parameter that may depend on the reliability of the supplier. In case the agreement is not reached, a new number a of suppliers among the consulted s is determined: obviously, in such a case the product costs increase, because the costs already paid for the failed contract (i.e. the research and the negotiation costs) have to be added to the new ones in order to determine the total price of the requested product/service. Finally, the costs of drafting and approval of the contract C DA are calculated according to (4).
Step 4. Determine the quality control costs. This step implements the probability distribution of the control time, i.e., the Beta distribution defined by (7). Then a control time is chosen at random, so that it is possible to determine the quality control costs C Q according to (5).
Step 5. Determine the enforcement costs. This last step determines, in an analogous way to the previous one, the enforcement costs, that complete the evaluation of the ACP. In particular, the probability distribution of the enforcement time, i.e., the exponential distribution expressed by (8), is considered. Then an enforcement time is chosen at random to determine the enforcement costs C E according to (6).
Once all the ex ante and ex post costs are known, it is possible to determine the additional costs of purchasing by adding them according to (9). Finally, such costs are added to the purchasing price obtained in
Step 2 and corresponding to the chosen supplier, in order to determine the total costs associated with the transaction.
The described theoretical model of the transaction requires as inputs several data, related to the particular buyer/seller relationship, that are synthetically represented by blocks FIS1 to FIS6 in Figure 4 . The next Section shows how fuzzy logic based reasoning may be employed in order to determine these inputs to the transaction model.
THE FUZZY LOGIC INFERENCE SYSTEM
The theoretical model for the purchasing price and the ACP described in the previous Section is based on the evaluation of ex ante and ex post costs. Both such costs categories require the quantification of several data related to the buyer operating the transaction. In particular, some parameters characterizing the exchange are deterministic and known by the buyer or may be estimated on the basis of expert advice. These are listed in the sequel:
• the number of suppliers to be consulted s;
• the average purchasing price µ;
• the maximum acceptable standard deviation of the purchasing price σ max ;
• the maximum preference rate γ max ;
• the standardization level of the required product SL, expressed as the 0÷1 degree of customisation. In particular, 0 corresponds to totally customized products, 1 to completely standardized goods and all the other values correspond to products in between; • the supply value SV, expressed as the 0÷1 economic importance of the supply for the specific firm. Obviously, a value close to 0 is typical of a low supply value, while a value close to 1 is typical of a high supply value;
• the supplier reliability R, expressed as the 0÷1 degree of reliability. In particular, 0 corresponds to a totally unreliable supplier, e.g. a new one, 1 to a completely reliable contractor, e.g. a well-known one, and all the other values correspond to providers with characteristics in between;
• the success probability that a consulted supplier is available to bid for the product p;
• the probability of agreement with a supplier P s ;
• the hour costs c A , c E and c C ;
• the characteristic parameter b 1 of the control time binomial distribution, that determines the particular shape of the distribution and hence its appropriateness in modeling the control time phenomenon;
• all the maximum acceptable values of the time parameters connected to the transaction, i.e. the maximum research and contact times t Rmax and t Cmax , the maximum negotiation time t Nmax , the maximum time for drafting and approving the contract t DAmax , the maximum quality control times t Qmax0 and t Qmax1 for the limit cases SV=0 and SV=1 and finally the maximum enforcement time t Emax .
On the contrary, several other parameters descriptive of the exchange are significantly influenced from the uncertainty characterizing the transaction and are therefore subjective with respect to the buyer/seller specific relationship.
These are the following:
• the standard deviation of the purchasing price σ;
• the degree of preference of a supplier γ;
• all the time parameters connected to the transaction, i.e. the research and contact times t R and t C , the negotiation time t N , the time for drafting and approving the contract t DA , the quality control time t Q and finally the enforcement time t E .
Hence, in order to correctly simulate the behavior of the buyer, some interviews with logistic and purchasing managers, belonging to different fields, were required. Starting from such expert judgments, in this section we propose to employ fuzzy logic in order to synthesize the subjective data required for the transaction model. Indeed, fuzzy logic provides a natural framework to incorporate qualitative knowledge with quantitative information such as real data. Therefore, fuzzy reasoning is particularly suitable for determining, on the basis of the subjective and qualitative knowledge provided by the interviewed experts, the subjective additional costs of purchasing parameters required as an input to the simulation model described in the previous section. To this aim, a Fuzzy logic Inference System (FIS) is designed, composed of six different fuzzy systems, indicated in the sequel by FIS1 to FIS6.
Component FIS1 addresses the problem of determining the standard deviation of the purchasing price, normalized in the 0÷1 range, Σ on the basis of the standardization level of the required product SL by using quantitative rules. In particular, FIS1 employs two simple qualitative rules, depicted in Table 1 , that evaluate the normalized standard deviation Σ in the 0÷1 range by way of the input variable SL. For the sake of simplicity, the membership functions for variables SL and Σ of FIS1 are triangular and cross vertically at a 0.5 degree of membership (completeness level). In particular, the membership functions of the fuzzy sets Low (L) and High (H) describing the corresponding input and output variables are represented in Figures 5 and 6a , respectively. Hence, the resulting value of the standard deviation of the purchasing price:
is employed in
Step 2 of the theoretical model once the standardization level of the product/service is defined and parameter SL is determined. Similarly to FIS1, FIS2 addresses the problem of determining the degree of preference of a supplier, normalized in the 0÷1 range, Γ on the basis of the supplier reliability R. The corresponding rule table is depicted in Table 2 
FIS2 Preference
where we neglected for the sake of simplicity the index indicating the generic supplier.
Moreover, FIS3 evaluates the time parameters, normalized in the 0÷1 range, connected to the research and negotiation costs, i.e. the normalized research and contact times T R and T C and the normalized negotiation time T N on the basis of the standardization level of the required product SL, the supplier reliability R and the supply value SV. The rule table is depicted in Table 3 
that are employed in
Step 1 of the transaction theoretical model for the calculation of the research, contact and negotiation time for each supplier involved in the transaction (see Figure 4 ).
FIS3 Research, Contact and Negotiation Times
Inputs 
FIS4 Drafting and Approval Time
Inputs In addition, component FIS4 evaluates the drafting and approval of the contract time parameter, normalized in the 0÷1 range, T DA . This is determined on the basis of the standardization level of the required product SL, the supplier reliability R and the supply value SV . The rule table is depicted in Table 4 
Furthermore, FIS5 evaluates the average quality control time, normalized in the 0÷1 range, M Q based on the standardization level SL and the reliability of the chosen supplier R. The rule table is depicted in Table 5 and SV=1, respectively indicated as t Qmax0 and t Qmax1 , as follows:
The obtained output M Q of the fuzzy inference system is employed in
Step 4 of the transaction model in order to build the Beta distribution according to (7) as follows (Kelton et al., 1998) :
so that the normalized control time T Q may be determined by (7) and finally by the value of t Qmax calculated according to (17) the control time is calculated as follows:
The last component of the fuzzy logic system is FIS6, that evaluates the average enforcement time, normalized in the 0÷1 range, M E based on the three inputs SL, R and SV. The rule table is depicted in Table 6 
so that in
Step 5 of the transaction model the exponential distribution of the enforcement time may be determined, according to (8). Finally, for the sake of simplicity the fuzzy operators implementing the fuzzy inference in all the described FIS components are chosen as follows: the minimum as and operator, the maximum as or operator, the minimum as implication method, the center of gravity as defuzzification method.
FIS5 Average Control Time
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THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
THE SIMULATION SPECIFICATION
The theoretical model is synthesized in the software Arena (Kelton et al., 1998 Table 7 corresponding to simulation P1.
In this test we consider s=2 consulted suppliers, an average purchasing price of € 50,000 with a maximum standard deviation σ max =20% of the purchasing price,
i.e. € 10,000, a maximum preference rate for the generic supplier γ max =0.25, a standardization level of the required product SL equal to 0.25, a supply value SV=0.80 and a reliability of the two suppliers R equal to 0.70 and 0.45, respectively. The probability that these suppliers accept to bid is respectively 0.90 and 0.60 and the probability to reach the agreement is P S =0.95. Moreover, the considered column reports the hour costs for the buyer c A =30 €, for the lawyer c E =150 € and for the quality control employee c C =50 €, respectively. In addition, the characteristic parameter defining the shape of the Beta distribution (7) is b 1 =1.5. Finally, the maximum values of the times required to calculate the ACP, are the following: t Rmax =4.00 h (maximum time of research), t Cmax =8.00 h (maximum time of contact), t Nmax =24.00 h (maximum time of negotiation), t DAmax =36.00 h (maximum time of drafting and approval of the contract), t Qmax0 =30.00 h (maximum time of quality control for the limit normalized supply value SV=0), t Qmax1 =100.00 h (maximum time of quality control for the limit normalized supply value SV=1) and finally t Emax =100.00 h (maximum time of legal enforcement).
An independent replication method is used to obtain the estimate of the total and additional costs of purchasing, with a confidence interval of 95%. More precisely, for each simulation the cost estimates are deduced by 10,000 independent replications, so that significant results from a statistical point of view are obtained. 
ACP Analysis Simulation
THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As an example, the additional costs and total cost of purchasing resulting from the simulation labeled by P1 (P3) in Table 7 The ACP and TCP resulting from the four considered simulations are reported in Table 8 . In order to improve readability, the table also reports the number of considered suppliers s in the corresponding transaction, the average purchasing price µ, the normalized standardization level SL and the supply value SV of the transaction. Hence, the simulations consider the four kinds of products, i.e. P1 to P4, mainly characterized by a difference in the level of information flows for the purchasing process and the amount of risk. Observing the results in Table 8 , we remark that the ACP may be a little part of the total costs (about 11%) for products P3 and P4, characterized by a high standardization level and a low supply value. On the contrary, the ACP represent a more relevant percentage of the total costs (about 20%) in the case of products P1 and P2, both characterized by a low standardization level and a high supply value. In addition, the results in Table 8 confirm that customized products (i.e. P1 and P2) require higher total costs than standardized goods (i.e. P3 and P4). Moreover, the obtained simulation results reported in Table 8 show that, as the number of consulted suppliers increases, the ACP increase accordingly. However, as the number of suppliers is raised, the probability to get a lower purchasing price increases accordingly (compare the results for P1
and P2 and for P3 and P4 in Table 8 ). Obviously, such a phenomenon is more noticeable in the case of a customized product (e.g. consider P1 and P2 in Table 8 ).
CONCLUSIONS
The paper proposes an approach to estimate the additional costs of purchasing, which are a part of the transaction costs as defined by Coase, connected to the exchange of a new product/service before the transaction is actually carried out, so that a decision support system for the buyer is available. The problem is addressed by proposing a model for the buyer/seller relationship, that focuses on the uncertainty characterizing the exchange and the connected costs. In particular, based on a well-known classification, the ACP are determined using appropriate deterministic models for ex ante costs and suitable statistical distributions for ex post costs. Moreover, a fuzzy logic inference system is designed for synthesizing, starting from expert judgments, the required data to the ACP model. We evaluate the model by simulating several transactions on the basis of data obtained by interviews with a buyer of an industrial company.
The reported simulation experiments show the effectiveness of the proposed model in estimating the additional costs of purchasing and total costs associated with a generic purchasing process. Moreover, the obtained results
show the interesting connections of additional and total costs with the total number of suppliers and the product standardization level. The model can be used to determine the optimal number of suppliers to be consulted when a new product is requested from the buyer, i.e. the number of buyers that balances the
